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DURING the past several years, considerable support has been given the
notion that the federal tax structure is too heavily weighted with direct
taxes. This conference was concerned with a broad range of questions
relating to the effects of shifting the federal tax structure in the direc-
tion of greater reliance on indirect taxation as opposed to taxation of
individual and corporation incomes. Particular attention was focused
on the implications of such a shift for resource allocation, tax equity,
the rate of economic growth, the pattern of international trade and the
balance of payments, tax administration and compliance, and inter-
governmental fiscal relations. European experience, often cited by those
who favor greater reliance on indirect taxes, was considered in some
detail.
This summary presents brief outlines of major points raised in the
principal papers together with summaries of the highlights of the open
discussion sessions.
Welfare and Growth
Harberger's paper focuses on the comparative welfare costs, or excess
burdens, of direct and indirect taxes. Part of his analysis concerns
choices between work and leisure and between savings and consump-
tion. Drawing on the conclusions of this analysis, Harberger considers
the effects of alternative tax structures on the rate of economic growth.
Since both income and excise taxes affect the work-leisure choice,
Harberger finds that there is no a priori theoretical case in favor of
direct taxation. He holds, however, that excise taxes which are not very
general, and are imposed at relatively high rates on commodities for
which the elasticities of demand are relatively high, will involve more
excess burdens than will income taxes of equal yield.
With respect to the savings-consumption choice, Harberger finds that
income taxation reduces the rate of saving more than would a consump-
tion tax of equal yield. He argues, however, that the welfare costs stem-
ming from the present differential income tax treatment of different
kinds of capital income (under the corporation income tax) are sub-
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stantially greater than the welfare costs arising from the influence of
the tax on the rate of saving.
Harberger concludes that the effect of taxation on the labor-leisure
choice is of negligible consequence for the economy's growth rate, but
that the effect on the savings-consumption choice may reduce the econ-
omy's annual growth rate by as much as one-tenth or two-tenths of a
percentage point. Citing research done at Chicago, however, he argues
that marginal changes in the rate of investment do not significantly
affect the extent to which technical progress is "embodied" in capital
formation.
Brown, in his discussion of Harberger's paper, points out that mar-
ginal rates of transformation and of substitution may be unequal for
many reasons other than the differential effects of taxes, so that a change
in taxes that would entail welfare losses in a setting of ideal equilibrium
could, in the real world, yield a welfare gain, bringing marginal rates of
substitution and transformation closer together. In any event, he argues,
the proper objective of policy is to equate marginal social costs and bene-
fits. Since private costs and benefits need not reflect their social equiva-
lents, certain tax-induced distortions in private resource use would
conform more closely with social aims than complete neutrality.
In the measurement of welfare costs of taxes as they affect the savings-
consumption choice, Brown argues that the relevant comparison is be-
tween present values of alternative lifetime consumption patterns, using
the after-tax rate of interest for discounting.
Brown agrees that a shift in the direction of more indirect taxation
would have a minor effect on the rate of growth if the distribution of tax
burdens were unaltered. He questions, however, the realism of assuming
that income distribution will not be affected. Brown contends that the
maj or support for a shift toward more indirect taxation derives precisely
from the expectation of altering the distribution of income after tax.
Once such redistribution is allowed for, it is probable that the shift will
raise the rate of saving at full employment.
Feliner contends that Harberger's assumption of full employment is
ambiguous because the means by which full employment comes about
are not specified. Comparisons of excise and income taxes with equal
yields are not necessarily relevant, since some taxes repress private de-
mands less than others.
Feliner points out that recent advocacy of greater emphasis on in-
direct taxes has rested on arguments not directly considered by Har-
berger. Pointing out that all taxes except lump-sum levies involve excess
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burdens because they alter resource uses, he contends that imposition of
sales taxes on nonnecessities changes economic decisions in a direction
that is consistent with avowed policy objectives. Although ideal income
taxes involve less excess burden than excises, it is not obvious that such
ideal taxes can be enacted, and the taxation of income in this country
falls well short of the ideal. In practice, then, greater reliance on excise
taxes may strengthen the tax system in terms of equity and efficiency.
Feliner expresses skepticism over Harberger's analysis of the work-
leisure choice because the findings hinge partly on "guesses" of the
elasticity of supply of labor with respect to real wages. If the guesses
are altered within a range of reasonable uncertainty, rather different
results will be obtained. Feilner also questions Harberger's conclusion
about the effect of greater saving on the growth rate, because raising
the rate of large-scale investment may yield important external effects,
neglected by Harberger, through encouraging a fuller exploitation of
innovations.
In the general discussion, Harberger's estimates of the welfare loss
stemming from a system of partial excises provoked considerable de-
bate, demonstrating once again that the welfare aspects of taxation are
not settled doctrine. Several discussants doubted the accuracy of Har-
berger's "triangle" measure of excess burden. The triangle in question
has an area equal to one-half the amount of tax per unit times the tax-
induced reduction in the number of units of output of the taxed good.
This triangle, assumed to measure the difference between the integrals
of the demand curve and the cost curve (assumed to be horizontal) over
the distance between before-tax and after-tax rates of consumption,
represents foregone consumer surplus.
It was pointed out that the assumption embodied in the triangle ap-
proach—that the demand curve is a straight line over the range in
question—is not necessarily correct. If the demand curve were convex
to the origin, the welfare loss would be overstated (and if it were con-
cave, the loss would be understated) by the area of Harberger's triangle.
Defenders of the triangle approximation argued that for a relatively
small tax the criticism had little validity, since over any short interval
a demand curve is likely to have something close to a straight-line con-
figuration. The basis for this argument is that a demand curve must
have a very curious shape if it is to bend sharply over a small part of
its range.
More fundamentally, the validity of Harberger's entire approach was
questioned on grounds familiar to those who have followed the postwar
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literature on excise-tax theory. First, the propriety of making the re-
quired interpersonal comparisons of utility was questioned. But further,
even if these interpersonal comparisons are accepted, introduction of an
excise tax necessarily reduces welfare only if all prices are optimal before
the tax is imposed. Since this condition is not likely to be found in any
real situation, imposition of excises may cause a move either toward or
away from the optimum.
In its strongest form, criticism of Harberger's analysis asserted that
for all an economist can tell, one point on the production frontier is just
as "good" as any other point. A movement along the frontier caused by
excise taxation simply means that those who consume relatively more
of the taxed commodity are worse off while those who consume relatively
more of untaxed commodities are better off, the net gain or loss in welfare
being unmeasurable.
The Harberger thesis was defended with the argument that such an
agnostic approach makes prescriptive economic analysis impossible.
Rather, economists should push for elimination of all distortions of the
pricing mechanism, wherever they are found, unless the distortions can
be justified on positive grounds. Any change that reduces differences
between marginal rates of substitution and transformation is likely to
be a change for the better.
Finally, Harberger's constant-cost assumption rules out consideration
of the impact of excise taxation on relative factor prices and incomes.
This assumption bothered persons who believe that productive resources
are rather highly specialized to particular uses, so that any reshuffling
of the product mix implies a significant reduction in relative income
shares of resources used heavily in production of the taxed commodity.
Harberger pointed out that the assumption was made partly to facilitate
exposition of the basic ideas, but that it was not a necessary assumption
for the analysis. Some discussants, who ventured the guess that resource
specialization is not in fact very important, agreed with Harberger's
focus on the readjustment of product prices and his attendant neglect
of induced changes in factor prices.
Harberger's empirical propositions about the effect of income taxes on
output through distortion of the work-leisure choice were questioned.
For one thing, his assumption that a change in labor hours has had in
the past, and would have in the future, a proportional effect on output
did not agree with the views of one discussant whose own feeling, based
on a somewhat different interpretation of the historical record, was that
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output responds somewhat less than proportionately to a change in hours
worked. Additionally, it was questioned whether workers are really able
to control the decision as to hours worked, at least to the point of mak-
ing a small adjustment in response to relatively minor tax changes.
Harberger responded that the intent of his argument had been to
indicate that under any plausible assumptions about the nature of the
labor-leisure choice and its output implications, the effect of income
taxation would be small, so that substitution of excise taxes (which
themselves would also have some effect on this choice) could hardly be
justified on welfare or efficiency grounds. All in all, the group seemed to
accept Harberger's conclusion that two taxes with the same distribu-
tional effects, one an excise and the other an income levy, would not
have significantly different effects on the labor-leisure choice.
A closely related issue is the effect of consumption taxation on the
rate of saving. Those who argued that a shift by the federal government
from direct to indirect taxes would inevitably reduce the over-all pro-
gressivity of the tax system also envisaged a rise in the full employment
level of saving due to the increase in incomes of persons with high mar-
ginal propensities to save. This view was not, of course, accepted by
those who denied the inevitability of reducing progression by shifting
to more indirect taxation.
It was generally agreed that a shift to consumption taxes would make
savers better off relative to consumers, since consumption taxes do not
tax interest when it is earned.
In response to questions, Harberger elaborated his argument that
variations in the rate of capital formation produce only minor variations
in the growth rate. It had been asked whether this implied that a zero
(or negative) rate of investment was compatible with a positive rate of
growth. Harberger replied that it did not. He ventured the view that the
highest-priority investments, those that would be undertaken even at
very high interest rates, do in fact embody the fruits of technological
advance. But such investment opportunities are relatively rare, and the
bulk of lower-yielding outlets available at a normal rate of capital forma-
tion do not embody technological gains to any significant extent. There-
fore, only if investment is retrenched severely will the gains from
embodiment be lost. In other words, a relatively low rate of investment,
confined to a few high-priority needs, is sufficient to yield most of the
fruits of technological advance, making the over-all rate of productivity
increase rather insensitive to most fluctuations in the rate of investment.
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Allocation Aspects
Musgrave and Richman deal in their paper with the effects of a shift
from the corporate profits tax to a value-added tax of either the income
or consumption variety. They concentrate on questions of resource allo-
cation, international commodity flows, and the balance of payments. In
general the authors provide two solutions for every problem considered:
one on the assumption that the corporate profits tax is shifted and a
second on the assumption that it is not. The shifting in question is
"short-run shifting," which involves tax-induced increases of adminis-
tered prices sufficient to prevent any incursion of the tax into the net
rate of return on corporate capital. Such shifting is assumed to take
place, if at all, only in the case of products sold domestically.
If the corporate profits tax is not shifted, substitution of a value-added
tax of the income type, applicable to all production, will transfer tax
burdens regressively (away from profits and onto wages), raise invest-
ment incentives, and, possibly, reduce excess burden. If, however, the
corporation profits tax is shifted, such a substitution would not bring a
significant change in the over-all progressivity of the tax system, nor
would it do much to enhance investment incentives. It would, however,
reduce excess burden by eliminating the effects of the profits tax on rela-
tive prices of corporate and noncorporate products.
A value-added tax of the consumption variety, if substituted for a
nonshif ted corporate profits tax, will provide an even greater investment
stimulus than would a change toa value-added tax of the income type.
If the profits tax is shifted, substitution of a value-added tax on con-
sumption items oniy will again increase incentives to invest. In either
case, a value-added tax on consumption will favor savers when compared
with a value-added tax of the income variety.
The international implications of replacing the corporate income levy
with a value-added tax also hinge on assumptions as to shifting. Further-
more, the results depend on the degree to which resources are mobile
internationally.
A tax on corporate profits which cannot be shifted in the short run will
distort international resource allocation if capital can move internation-
ally to avoid the tax. This result is avoided if income to capital is taxed
at rates prevailing in the country of residence of the owner rather than
at the rates of the country in which it is employed ("country of activ-
ity"). Although taxes on income to capital—whether by country-of-
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residence or country-of-activity rates—have no direct distorting effect
on commodity flows, they may indirectly affect the volume and direction
of commodity trade.
A value-added tax of the income type, provided it has an export rebate
and compensating import tax provision, does not distort commodity
flows, but it may distort resource allocation. This is because such a tax
bears partly on income to capital, which may be more mobile interna-
tionally than other resources. A value-added tax of the consumption
variety avoids this possible defect because income to capital is not taxed.
Substituting a value-added tax for a corporation profits tax will reduce
capital exports and increase capital imports if the corporation income
tax is not shifted, since net rates of return to corporate capital will
increase. If domestic prices rise in response to the change, the allocation
of capital between domestic and export industries will be unaffected;
but if domestic prices, inclusive of tax, do not rise, capital will be moved
into export- and import-competing industries. On balance, it is held,
exports will rise and imports will fall if the domestic price level is
unchanged; but if the domestic price level rises by the amount of the
tax, the change will have no short-run effects on trade.
If the profits tax is shifted, the change from a profits tax to a value-
added tax of the income type, with export rebates and compensating
import taxes, will have favorable effects on the trade account but only
minor effects on the capital account. The substitution will shift domestic
capital to export industries but will have little effect on international
capital flows.
If the profits tax were retained but an export rebate and compensating
import tax were instituted, exports would be encouraged because capital
could escape the tax in export industries, and imports would be dis-
couraged because their prices would rise.
In the light of their analysis, and considering the competing objectives
of tax policy, the authors oppose substituting a value-added tax of the
income type for the present corporation income tax.
In his discussion paper, Shoup holds that the most useful distinction
to make between direct and indirect taxes is that direct taxes can be
"personalized" or tailored to the particular economic and social charac-
teristics of the household being taxed, whereas indirect taxes cannot be
so tailored. From this point of view the common distinction which
equates direct taxation with income taxation and indirect taxation with
consumption taxation is not useful or correct.
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Shoup points out that the presumption that the U.S. corporation in-
come tax entails an excess burden may be incorrect. The preferential tax
treatment of capital gains that arise from retention of corporate earnings
may make the combined corporation and individual levies on profits
from corporate activity less than the tax on noncorporate earnings.
Krause, in his discussion paper, contends that substitution of a value-
added tax for the corporation income tax will improve the U.S. balance
of payments whether the income tax is shifted or not. If it is not shifted,
the improvement will show up on capital account; if it is shifted, the
current account balance will increase. Krause criticizes the Musgrave-
Richman policy prescriptions on the ground that the question of shif t-
ing, shown earlier in the paper to be crucial, is ignored in the policy
conclusions section. Furthermore, he contends, it is not proper to reject
a change in taxes on the ground that it amounts to tax dumping, since
under fixed exchange rates and an inadequate international monetary
mechanism, any kind of corrective action by a deficit country must
either conflict with liberal international trade policies or involve in-
tolerable domestic contraction. Thus, adjustment of indirect tax rates
should be viewed as a possible substitute for flexible exchange rates in
correcting international imbalances without forcing domestic contrac-
tion.
In the general discussion, the short-run shifting process envisaged in
the Musgrave-Richman paper for the corporate profits tax was chal-
lenged as not really applicable. Even if short-run shifting is attempted
through increases of administered prices, it does not produce an equi-
librium that can be maintained. The rise in prices must lead to reduced
sales of corporate products; and resources, particularly capital, will be
pushed into noncorporate lines. The net after-tax return to capital in
both corporate and noncorporate uses will fall, and an excess burden
arising from the tax-induced disparity of pretax returns to capital may
fall on product buyers.
The further question arose whether, given the Musgrave-Richman
view of short-run shifting of the corporation income tax, it is reasonable
to assume that "deshifting" would occur if the tax were lowered. At
best, in one person's view, this might happen slowly if at all so that
substitution of a value-added tax for the corporate income levy might
simply result in still higher prices. Such gains might either finance addi-
tional capital formation or be captured by labor unions via stiffer bar-
gaining demands.
The shifting aspects of a value-added tax were also questioned. Fear
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was expressed that imposition of a perfectly general value-added tax
might not have the neutral impact on relative prices and relative in-
come shares assumed in much of the Musgrave-Richman treatment. In
particular, the tax might be shifted forward in areas where labor and
management administer prices, but backward in other areas, especially
agriculture.
Discussion of the important issue of effects on the balance of payments
centered around the question of introducing a value-added tax of the
income type in place of the corporation income tax or some part of it.
Again, the Musgrave-Richman assumption that a value-added tax en-
genders uniform price increases was questioned. In fact, it was argued,
if the corporation income tax is not shifted, substitution of a value-added
tax would logically raise prices by less than the full percentage of the tax,
since no markup would be applied to at least that part of costs included
in the definition of taxable corporate income. In this case, substitution
of a value-added tax with export rebate for the profits tax would lower
U.S. prices to foreigners and bring an increase in the net trade balance.
In one view, the imposition of a value-added tax of, say, 7 per cent,
in place of the present U.S. corporation income tax, would raise marginal
cost curves by 7 per cent and would therefore raise prices by just that
amount. But this did not directly meet the argument that under condi-
tions of nonshiftability of the corporate tax, after-tax profits are a re-
sidual not subject to "markup." A somewhat different defense of the
Musgrave-Richman conclusion was that if the costs of hired inputs rise
by 7 per cent, product prices must rise equally to maintain the equality
of marginal value product and price at full employment. This, of course,
raises the question of whether effects on the employment level would in
fact be offset by fiscal and monetary policies.
There was general acceptance of the view that money wages in this
country are inflexible downward, so that imposition of a value-added tax
would engender pressures for markup. A possibly important qualifica-
tion to the full-markup thesis was advanced, however. The rate of in-
crease in money wages might be dampened by imposing a value-added
tax, so that through time the tax would absorb gains that would other-
wise have gone to labor as increased wages.
One person argued that even if wages are completely inflexible down-
ward, substitution of a value-added tax for the corporation income levy
might not raise prices at all. If the timing of the change were managed
so that total cash payments of tax by corporations were not altered,
prices need not be affected. This view discounts entirely the importance
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of the kind of tax being levied, treating all taxes alike as a blanket ele-
ment of cost subject to markup. Such a complete dismissal of the struc-
tural aspects of taxation was of course disputed.
The argument that unequal rates of tax on corporation income distort
the international allocation of resources unless offset by export rebates
raised several questions. It was submitted that even if all countries taxed
profits at the same rate, the proportions of corporate to noncorporate
exports might differ considerably, and the neutrality condition would
not be fulifiled. A closer approximation to neutrality might be achieved
by lowering corporate income tax rates in countries where exports were
more heavily weighted with products of corporations. There developed,
at this point, some difference of opinion as to whether U.S. exports are
more heavily weighted with corporate products than the average of the
rest of the world.
A second criticism of the argument that unequal profits tax rates are
nonneutral related to use of the proceeds of corporate taxation. The
Musgrave-Richman discussion of the possible usefulness of value-added
taxes as benefit levies was recalled, and it was pointed out that corporate
income taxes, too, might be considered benefit levies in some cases. Sup-
pose, it was argued, that two countries impose corporate profits taxes,
one at 50 per cent and the other at 25 per cent, and that both use the
proceeds entirely to finance worker pensions which are substitutes for
wages. In this case, neutrality would be served by leaving things as they
are, rather than by attempting to compensate for the differential through
some sort of rebate system.
Moreover, the relevance of comparing tax structures in different
countries through the "snapshot technique" was challenged on the
ground that the snapshot should also include exchange rates, which
have in part been shaped by the impact of tax structures on trade re-
lationships.
The case for substitution of a value-added tax with export rebates and
compensating import duties for the corporation income tax was a matter
of some disagreement, because of the multiple uncertainties concerning
the effect on domestic prices. The suggestion that export rebates and
compensating import taxes are justified only to the extent that a value-
added tax leads to an increase in the domestic price level (with the sup-
port of monetary policy) was held by one discussant to raise a question
whose answer could never be known. He concluded that the only work-
able course is to treat monetary policy as an independent variable.
It was also argued that, though rebating value-added taxes might be
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logically neater, the international trade implications differ little from
those of rebating some part of the present corporate profits tax paid by
firms producing exports. Therefore, the latter course, which does not
require such drastic revision of the present tax structure, should be con-
sidered seriously as an alternative.
The administrative feasibility of exempting exports from value-added
taxes was questioned. Since most firms produce multiple lines for sale in
different markets, and since most goods pass through several stages of
production, it would seem difficult to set up a rebate system that has the
desired effects. It was pointed out that the French handle such problems
by levying a tentative tax on the gross receipts of every firm, and then
grant credit against tax for all taxes levied at earlier stages and shown
on invoices. Under this plan, exemption of particular commodities can
be simply achieved by exempting eligible sales from tentative gross-
receipts tax at the final stage, while still granting the credit for all taxes
paid at prior stages. At least under ideal conditions, the market mecha-
nism would bring about the practical result of removing the effect of the
tax on exempt goods, from first to final stage. This system would require
cash rebates to firms whose tentative tax on rionexempt sales was less
than their credit for taxes paid at previous stages.
Equitq Aspects
Eldridge's paper deals with the effects of a shift from direct to indirect
taxes on the over-all equity of the tax system, on costs of compliance
and administration, and on intergovernmental fiscal relations. His con-
clusions with respect to equity depend upon comparison of the distribu-
tion of tax burdens of different tax forms yielding equal revenues.
Eldridge contends that considerably greater certainty attaches to the
distribution of individual income tax burdens than to indirect tax bur-
dens. Accordingly, greater reliance on indirect taxes implies use of a much
cruder and less reliable method for achieving tax equity. The assumption
that indirect tax burdens can be allocated wholly to consumers (and
therefore are borne in proportion to consumption of taxed items) implies
that all of the significant effects of a shift from income to excise or sales
taxes are found in the readjustment of prices of final products. In fact,
important readjustments of factor prices may also occur, and these must
be considered in any discussion of the equity aspects of indirect taxation.
Thus, while an indirect tax applicable to all output would be equivalent
to a general, flat-rate income tax applicable to all factor payments, an
indirect tax applying only to all consumption will differ from an income
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tax. Not only will final product prices be affected, but the incomes of
resources specialized to the production of taxed products will also be
changed. The precise effects of substituting partial indirect taxes for
general taxes depend on the production functions of industries producing
items subject to tax and of nontaxed industries, as well as on the re-
spective elasticities of demand for the outputs of the taxed and untaxed
industries, and on the respective elasticities of supply of productive re-
sources to the taxed and untaxed industries. It may be that resource-
income gains and losses will be randomly distributed by income classes.
In such a case, the shift would be neutral, in aggregative terms, on the
income sources side. But only in this case is the effect on the structure
of prices of final output the proper criterion for appraising the over-all
distributional impact of the shift.
With respect to the use of broad-based indirect taxes, Eldridge notes
that substitution of a value-added tax of the income variety for part of
the income tax would involve giving up elements of progression for an
essentially proportional tax; and a shift to a general consumption tax—
either one on retail sales or a value-added tax of the "consumption"
variety—would tend to make the tax burden distribution regressive to
the extent that the proportion of income saved increases as income
levels rise.
Eldridge finds that elimination of the present bias against corporate
equity investment is desirable both in terms of equity and in terms of
economic neutrality. Although• substituting a value-added tax for the
corporate profits tax would be a step toward neutrality, the substitution
would accentuate problems of integrating business and personal taxes so
as to achieve an equitable distribution of the total burden among indi-
viduals. A superior approach to the problem, in Eldridge's view, involves
modifying the individual income tax and concentrating corporate tax
reform efforts on integration of the corporate and individual taxes.
Alternative criteria yield different conclusions about vertical equity
under various tax structures. If "Fisher" income is viewed as the appro-
priate tax base, general indirect taxes are not regressive. The choice
depends on whether one accepts Fisher's view that all economic benefits
stem from consumption. In this case, equating taxable capacity with
consumption is appropriate. But if one believes that saving as well as
consumption yields current satisfaction, the accretion concept of taxable
income is superior.
Eidridge rejects the argument that sales taxes can be made as pro-
gressive (with respect to income) as income taxes by proper use of ex-
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emptions. This argument, he points out, rests on the assumption that
burdens of indirect taxes fall entirely on persons as consumers, and not
at all on producers, and that these burden distributions can be accurately
inferred from budget studies of consumer units. Moreover, even if the
assumptions were valid, the standards of horizontal equity would not be
met. There is considerable evidence that sales taxes bear more heavily
on large families than on small families within every income group.
burdens also vary with racial, ethnic, and other family characteristics
such as rural or urban residence.
Eldridge notes that greater use of federal indirect taxes is often urged
as a means of reaching persons who avoid income taxes by takin.g ad-
vantage of the differential provisions in the law, or who evade their in-
come tax liabilities. But realistically, he holds, any indirect tax would
open up new avenues of avoidance and evasion.
Taking up problems of administration and compliance, Eldridge finds
that neither income taxes nor indirect taxes, if they are broadly based
and produce substantial revenues, involve prohibitive costs of compli-
ance and administration. However, costs of administration and com-
pliance increase significantly with departures from generality. Since a
shift toward indirect taxes would undoubtedly involve significant de-
partures from generality of coverage, it would create significant problems
of administration and compliance. Many of the problems would involve
definition, and in this sense would parallel those arising from income
taxation. Eldridge concludes that a shift to indirect taxes holds little
prospect of reducing compliance and administration costs. In this respect
be sees more promise in a move toward a low-rate income tax applicable
to adjusted gross income without exemptions.
Eldridge does not find that a substantial shift by the federal govern-
ment toward indirect taxation would hamper the ability of state and
local governments to finance their growing needs. However, such a shift
would lessen the significance of tax deductibility as an intergovern-
mental tax-coordinating device.
In his discussion of the Eldridge paper, Brazer argues that, in practice,
horizontal equity is impossible under a system of selective excises, and
that a truly general sales tax (with capital goods taxable), while it could
provide horizontal equity, is not feasible. Since it is also impossible to
achieve a truly general personal income tax, the choice between the two
taxes on horizontal equity grounds should rest on the political feasibility
of obtaining the more general tax. In terms of vertical equity, however,
Brazer finds income taxation clearly preferable to sales taxation. He
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therefore concludes that the best policy is to concentrate on perfecting
the coverage of the income tax.
On the matter of intergovernmental fiscal relations, Brazer discounts
the argument that the federal government should leave the indirect tax
field to states and ilocalities. Rather he sees some positive administrative
advantages in multilevel use of the same taxes.
Welch's discussion emphasizes that sales taxes in practice are never
truly general. Problems of administration as well as consideration of
other tax criteria result in partial levies, often with little underlying
rationale. Attempted enactment of a value-added tax would probably
encounter the same obstacles. Welch does not believe that a shift to
more federal indirect taxation would enhance intergovernmental fiscal
cooperation.
Most of the general discussion of the Eldridge paper focused on equity
problems. Eldridge had criticized the growing literature based on the
argument that a feasible excise-tax system could have substantial pro-
gression built into it. Proponents argue that such a system of excises
would catch spending out of income that now escapes tax, thereby pro-
moting horizontal equity and enforceable progression. For example,
excise taxes on consumption would reach those who finance additional
consumption out of lightly taxed capital gains, and better yet, it would
get at those who manage to avoid or evade the income tax completely.
The desirability of such an approach was, not surprisingly, a matter
of active debate. Several discussants argued that enactment of a truly
progressive system of excises is not feasible. Some were more optimistic
than others about prospects for broadening the coverage of the individ-
ual income tax in the relatively near future, and did not consider the
imposition of excises for the sake of broader coverage to be of much value
even if the intended progression could be achieved. Others pointed out
that major avenues of escape from income taxes could not be closed by
commodity taxes because the latter would not bear on substantial ele-
ments of income (particularly investment income and capital gains) that
are never disgorged on consumption. Nor would important types of non-
money income, such as imputed rent of owner-occupied houses, food and
fuel produced on farms, and implicit interest, be covered by excise taxes.
And even though it was granted that the partial coverage of the income
tax does create "excise-like" effects, it was argued strenuously that the
problem of fractional coverage would be much more serious under any
conceivable system of federal excise taxation. A maj or concern would be
the exemption of most services, which, as Brazer had pointed out in his
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discussion paper, the states have never been able to include in their sales-
tax bases,
The issue of the effects of excises on prices of productive resources (or
income sources) arose again, and in view of the importance of this ques-
tion, one of the participants lamented the lack of empirical work on this
subject. Basically, the question revolves around the ease with which
resources can be shifted from one use to another. Harberger's assump-
tion of constant costs entirely eliminates any effects on relative factor
prices from the analysis. Eldridge, on the other hand, stresses the pos-
sible importance of induced changes in factor prices.
One discussant offered the empirical proposition that indirect taxes
generally have a proportional incidence. On the product prices side, he
argued, it is almost impossible to devise an excise tax so as to hit only
purchases of high-income groups. For example, a tax on toiletries applies
to baby oil, and a tax on new automobiles raises used-car prices. On the
income side, he asserted, the tax reduces factor prices about proportion-
ately, and incidence will be diffused more or less equally among all re-
source owners. Thus, incidence is approximately proportional no matter
which way the tax is shifted.
Along the same lines, an argument was advanced that only if excise
taxes were levied on a significant proportion of the national product
would they be likely to have material effects on relative factor prices.
Apparently the supposition here is that "small" taxes induce only minor
displacements of resources and hence cannot produce more than minor
changes in relative resource earnings.
Noting that the available range of alternatives includes other taxes,
one discussant urged that serious consideration be given to enacting
more severe inheritance tax laws, especially in the case of inheritances
of younger generations. He argued that this would promote economic
equality in the most desirable way—by reducing the unjustified advan-
tages of those born to wealth. Somewhat along the same line, be con-
tended that more attention should be given to Henry George's property
taxation proposals designed to confiscate unearned property rents. Prop-
erly levied, such taxes would have no effect whatever on economic in-
centives, and they would greatly reduce economic inequality.
European Experience
Eckstein's paper compares the relative reliance on direct and indirect
taxes in the U.S., France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United King-
dom. After noting the conceptual ambiguities in any distinction between
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direct and indirect taxes, he defines direct taxes as levies on income,
estates and gifts, personal capital, and social security contributions paid
by the employee. All other levies are treated as indirect taxes.
On this basis, when receipts of all levels of government are included,
the ratio of direct taxes to total taxes in the U.S. is higher than in the
other countries considered. But the difference is much less dramatic than
is generally contended. Moreover, with the U.S. income tax cut enacted,
the ratio of U.S. direct taxes to GNP would be comparable to the ratio
in Germany and the United Kingdom.
Eckstein contends that the usual comparisons of the U.S. with other
countries are misleading because they generally consider only central
government revenues, include only income taxes in the direct tax cate-
gory, and relate direct taxes only to total tax revenues rather than to
GNP, the more relevant measure of impact. He also stressed the signifi-
cance of the comparative burdens of particular taxes, as contrasted to
comparison of relative dependence on various types of taxes.
Eckstein calls particular attention to statistics indicating that in the
countries under consideration, the rate of nonresidential investment as
a percentage of GNP is closely correlated with the percentage rate of
expansion of GNP during the 1950's. But, he holds, the impact of tax
policy on the rate of investment is not clear.
According to Eckstein, substitution of value-added taxation for the
corporation income tax would reduce the tax burden on high-profit cor-
porations and raise the burden on low-profit corporations. This, he holds,
would produce a more efficient allocation of capital. Further, such a
change would lead to substitution of capital for labor, would bring into
the tax base presently exempt organizations such as cooperatives, and
would reduce tax-caused distortions in decision making. He also foresees
an increased rate of business saving, reduced built-in flexibility of the
revenue system, and an expansion of exports following such a change.
Neumark, in his comment, contends that Eckstein's analysis rests on
too ambiguous a distinction between direct and indirect taxes. Further-
more, he argues that the alleged regressiveness of indirect taxes should
be appraised in light of the progressive expenditures they finance.
Neumark holds that it is not the relatively greater use of indirect taxes
that accounts for the favorable growth experience of countries examined
by Eckstein but rather their use of high tax rates, together with selective
tax abatements designed to direct activity into desired channels.
Smith, in his discussion paper, holds that the technical features of
various tax systems are more important sources of differences of tax im-
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pact than are variations of relative emphasis on broad categor.ies of types
of taxes. Thus, distinctions between direct and indirect taxes may he
meaningless or misleading in consideration of the impact of taxes on
growth, even if such distinctions are useful in other contexts.
In the general discussion, much attention was given to the implication
of Eckstein's observation that the correlation between growth rates and
rates of nonresidential investment was extremely high during the 1950's
for the countries he considered. Although Eckstein had declined to inter-
pret the precise meaning of this correlation, he had concluded that "a
high rate of growth over a considerable interval is, with little doubt,
always associated with a high rate of nonresidential investment."
Discussion of this point was confined to the notion that the high rate
of investment is the cause of the high rates of growth observed. This
view, of course, conflicts with the one set forth by Harberger in his
appraisal of the implications of accelerated investment for economic
growth. The question at stake was of paramount importance for the
conference. The case for more indirect taxation rests heavily on the
notion that the rate of investment will be increased and that the rate
of growth is closely associated with the rate of investment.
Out of the probing discussion of Eckstein's argument, two possibly
significant empirical criticisms emerged. The first was that if the sample
of countries were enlarged, and particularly if Latin American countries
were included, the relationship would become much less clear, and might
even disappear. Eckstein's paper, it was contended, happens to single
out countries where industrial investment was, due to peculiar circum-
stances of time and place, the crucial element in the growth process.
Second, the argument was advanced that if investment figures were
corrected for differences in the prices of investment goods relative to all
other prices, country by country, the apparent differences among rates
of capital formation would diminish or disappear, since the countries
with high ratios of investment to GNP were also the countries where
investment goods had higher relative prices. Thus, the raw figures cited
by Eckstein were alleged to give a somewhat misleading impression of
differences in ratios of increase of real capital stock to output.
A further criticism was that Eckstein had formulated the problem in-
correctly. According to this view, the relation of investment spending
to gross national product is not relevant for assessing the effects of in-
creased capital formation on the rate of economic growth. The correct
relationship is that between the percentage rate of growth of the capital
stock and the percentage rate of growth of GNP.
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It was not, of course, possible to settle all such questions on the spot.
Other factors, including low capital-labor ratios in war-devastated areas,
rapid expansion of labor forces, and the maintenance of high aggregate
demand were cited as important forces working for European economic
growth. But there was great reluctance to support the notion that in-
direct taxes provided a real key to the puzzle. The evidence just does
not seem to warrant such a conclusion. Rather, stress was put on the
role of tax concessions for investment, particularly investment in indus-
trial capital. In postwar years such concessions were made on both
direct and indirect taxes.
This view, however, raised the perplexing problem of Britain's slow
growth. Certainly Britain had granted heavy tax favors to investment.
Eckstein's paper had dismissed rather casually the idea that Britain's
problem was weak entrepreneurship. But strong arguments were raised
in favor of this thesis during the discussion. It was asserted that
imaginative investment decisions had become ritual and that Britain's
growth rate had thereby been made the captive of tradition. Further-
more, it was argued that the capital shortages Eckstein's paper referred
to were illusory—that in fact business saving provided a plentiful
supply of finance.
As Due pointed out in his summary of the issues, a clear distinction
must be made between the potential and the actual pace of economic
growth. At various points in the conference, participants were critical of
analyses which assumed full employment. With reference to the United
States, it was pointed out that perhaps 5 per cent could be added to
GNP simply by moving to a satisfactory rate of resource utilization.
Several persons saw the main impediment to full employment as the
federal government's unwillingness to run a sufficiently large deficit.
Under these conditions, any substitution of direct for indirect taxes that
raised the rate of saving would further complicate the unemployment
problem. Furthermore, it was pointed out that since the imposition of
indirect taxes would result in at least some markup of prices (including
tax), the level of spending needed to produce full employment would
increase. The European experience, which occurred in a setting of gen-
erally buoyant aggregate demand, was therefore held to be of doubtful
relevance in considerations of U.S. tax policy.
Conclvsion
The debate over the relative merits of direct and indirect taxes is an old
one. No two-day conference of experts can be expected to lay even the
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theoretical issues to rest, much less to resolve differing value judgments.
Since few issues of substance were unanimously agreed upon by the con-
ferees, it is hazardous to attempt to draw out a consensus. But certainly
the proceedings of the conference, viewed in their entirety, provide little
support for a major move in the direction of commodity taxation and
away from income taxation.
It was generally agreed that the distinction between direct in-
direct taxation is ambiguous, and that the specific features of taxes are
likely to be more important than superficial forms. The consensus
seemed to be that income taxation, imperfect as it is in practice, lends
itself better to keeping the welfare costs of taxes to a minimum, while
permitting considerably more latitude in adjusting the progressiveness
of the tax system.
On matters of administration and compliance, there seemed to be
general agreement that indirect taxes are not superior to direct taxes,
and there was some feeling that further inroads of the federal govern-
ment into the indirect tax field would arouse opposition from state and
local governments which rely heavily on such levies.
It seemed generally agreed that substitution of a value-added tax for
the corporation income tax would lead to an improvement of the balance-
of-payments position of this country, but few felt that the improvement
would be more than minor. From the of foreign experience, con-
siderable agreement emerged that the differences between U.S. and
European tax systems, with respect to relative reliance on indirect tax-
ation, have usually been overemphasized, and that the influence of these
differences on rates of economic growth is hard to detect. Rather, em-
phasis was given to the more specific features of taxes, direct or indirect,
that provide a special incentive for capital formation. Furthermore, the
importance of additional capital formation in the growth process was
questioned. And insofar as more indirect taxation in this country might
tend to raise the rate of saving, fear was expressed that the result might
be greater unemployment.
It is hard, then, to find much support for more reliance on indirect
taxation in the record of this conference, even though some participants
came, and left, with a disposition toward this view.
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